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Abstract
Signcryption has clear advantage over traditional sign-
then-encrypt schemes. However, the computational over-
head for signcryption is still too heavy when it is applied
to resource-constraint systems. In this paper, we propose
a generic construction of the identity-based online/offline
signcryption, where most of computations are carried out
when the associated message is still unavailable and the
online part of our scheme does not require any exponent
computations and therefore is very efficient. Our scheme
is generic and identity-based, in the sense it is indepen-
dent of the selection of signature and encryption algorithms.
Our scheme possesses the properties of ciphertext indistin-
guishability (IND-gCCA2) and existentially unforgeability
(UF-CMA).
1. Introduction
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive introduced by
Zheng [13] in 1997. The main idea of this primitive is to
carry out encryption and signature computations in a sin-
gle logical step to obtain confidentiality and authentication
more efficiently than the simple composition of encryption
and signature. Since Zheng’s seminal work, many efficient
signcryption schemes have been proposed.
The notion of identity-based cryptography was intro-
duced by Shamir in 1984 [10]. The system is realized by in-
troducing a trusted third party named Private Key Generator
(PKG) to produce a user’s private key corresponding to the
user’s identity. Shamir proposed an identity-based signa-
ture scheme, but for many years identity-based encryption
remained an open problem. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [3]
proposed a fully practical and functional identity-based en-
cryption scheme with security proof.
Identity-based notion was introduced to signcryption in
2002. Malone-Lee proposed an identity-based signcryption
solution [9]. However, it is not semantically secure. Libert
and Quisquater [8] proposed a solution to remedy the prob-
lem. Unfortunately, the properties of public verifiability and
forward security are mutually exclusive in their scheme.
Boyen [4] proposed a Multipurpose Identity-Based Sign-
cryption and gave the security notions for signcryption as:
message confidentiality, signature non-repudiation, cipher-
text unlinkability, ciphertext authentication, and ciphertext
anonymity. Chen and Malone-Lee proposed a more effi-
cient scheme [5] and their scheme provides a full security
analysis in the model of [4].
To extend the applicability of signcryption to low-power
devices, online/offline signcryption was introduced by An,
Dodis, and Rabin [1]. The online/offline notion can be
tracked to the earlier work due to online/offline signa-
tures. Even, Goldreich, and Micali [7] proposed the first
online/offline signature which is a generic scheme to con-
vert any signature scheme into an online/offline counter-
part. Their scheme increases the size of each signature by
a quadratic factor, hence, it only makes sense in theoretical
aspect. Another generic method to achieve online/offline
signing was proposed by Shamir and Tauman [11] in 2001.
The main advantage of the latter is that the length of the
key and signature are significantly reduced which is much
better than the former in practical sense. After that, a much
more efficient generic online/offline signature scheme was
proposed by Chen et al [6].
The work of online/offline signcryption due to An,
Dodis, and Rabin [1] mainly concentrates on the security
analysis of general combination of signature and encryption
scheme in asymmetric settings. No concrete scheme was
provided in [1]. Zhang, Mu, and Susilo [12] proposed the
first concrete online/offline signcryption scheme in 2005. In
their scheme, the online part does not require any expensive
computations so it is very efficient, and moreover, the size
of a signature is short since they use the notion of short sig-
nature.
Motivation and Contribution
Identity-based online/offline signcryption has potential
applicability to low-power devices. The reason is threefold.
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(1) Identity-based system avoids distribution of public keys.
(2) It allows expensive computation to be carried out in an
offline phase. (3) Signcryption achieves encryption and sig-
nature in a single logical step to obtain confidentiality and
authentication more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt
approach. In this paper, we propose a generic scheme of
identity-based online/offline signcryption, where the sign-
ing part and encryption part are generic.
Our contributions of this paper are as follows. We first
formally define the generic identity-based online/offline
signcryption and related security models. We then pro-
pose a generic construction of identity-based online/offline
signcryption. Our construction is based on chameleon hash
function and pairing over elliptic curves. It can achieve au-
thenticity and confidentiality simultaneously in an efficient
manner. We also provide a proof that the resultant scheme
is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (IND-gCCA2) and is existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA). Finally, we
present a new generic online/offline broadcast signcryption
as an extension.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the preliminaries required in this paper. In
Section 3, we formally define the generic identity-based on-
line/offline signcryption. We present our scheme and prove
its security in our model in Section 4 and Section 5. In Sec-
tion 6, we describe an extension of our scheme to broadcast
signcryption. We conclude this paper in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear Mapping
Let k be a security parameter and q be a k-bit prime num-
ber. Let G1 and G2 be groups of the same prime order q.
There is a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2 with the follow-
ing properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: for any generator P ∈ G1,
e(P, P ) = 1.
3. Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to com-
pute e(P,Q), for P,Q ∈ G1.
2.2. Security Assumptions
The security of our scheme is based on the intractability
of the following problem.
Definition 1. Gap-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
(GBDH) Let G1 and G2 be two groups of the same order q.
Let P be a generator of G1. Assume that there is a bilinear
mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let an attacker B to solve
the following problem: Given (P, aP, bP, cP ), compute a
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman key e(P, P )abc with the help of the
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) oracle, which
given (P, aP, bP, cP, d), outputs ture if d = e(P, P )abc
and false otherwise.
We define B’s advantage AdvGBDH
G1
(B) =
Pr[B(P, aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P )abc]. We say an algo-
rithm B (t, qb, ε) breaks GBDH in (G1, G2) if it makes qb
queries in time t, B has advantage greater than ε in solving
GBDH.
2.3. Chameleon Hash Family
Definition 2. [11] (chameleon hash family) A chameleon
hash family consists of a pair (L,H):
• Assume L is a probabilistic polynomial-time key gen-
eration algorithm that on input 1k, outputs a pair
(HK,TK) such that the sizes of HK, TK are poly-
nomially related to k.
• Assume H is a family of randomized hash functions.
Every hash function inH is associated with a hash key
HK, and is applied to a message from a spaceM and
a random element from a finite spaceR. The output of
hash function HHK does not depend on TK.
A chameleon hash family (L,H) has the following proper-
ties:
1. Efficiency: Given a hash key HK and a pair (m, r) ∈
M×R, HHK(m, r) can be computed in polynomial
time.
2. Collision resistance: There is no probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A that on input HK
outputs, with a non-negligible probability, two
pairs (m1, r1), (m2, r2) ∈ M × R that satisfy
HHK(m1, r1) = HHK(m2, r2) and m1 = m2.
3. Trapdoor collisions: There is a probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm that given a pair (HK,TK) ←
L(1k), a pair (m1, r1) ∈ M × R, and an additional
message m2 ∈M, outputs a value r2 ∈ R such that:
• HHK(m1, r1) = HHK(m2, r2).
• If r1 is uniformly distributed inR then the distri-
bution of r2 is computationally indistinguishable
from uniform inR.
We now present a construction of chameleon hash fam-
ily [11] with the elliptic curve analogue. The chameleon
hash function is based on discrete logarithm assumption.
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• System Parameters Generation Algorithm L: Let t
be a prime power, and E(Ft) an elliptic curve over fi-
nite field Ft. Let #E(Ft) be the number of points of
E(Ft), and P be a point of E(Ft) with prime order q
where q|#E(Ft). Denote G the subgroup generated
by P . Choose a random element x ∈R Z∗q , and com-
pute Y = xP . The public hash key is HK = (P, Y ),
and the private trapdoor key is TK = x.
• The Hash Family H: Given the hash key HK, the
proposed chameleon hash function HHK : Zq×Zq →
G is defined as follows: HHK(m, r)
def
= mP + rY .
3. Definition and Security Models of Generic
Identity-based Online/Offline Signcryption
3.1. Definition of Generic Identity-based
Online/Offline Signcryption
Definition 3. The generic identity-based online/offline
signcryption scheme is comprised of five algorithms: Sys-
tem Parameters Generation, Key Generation, OffSign-
crypt, OnSigncrypt and UnSigncrypt.
1. System Parameters Generation. Given a security
parameter k as input, the private key generator PKG
generates the system’s public parameters params, the
master secret key s, a chameleon hash family (L,H)
and an identity-based signature scheme (G,S,V),
where params and (G,S,V) are published in the sys-
tem, s is kept as secret by PKG and the chameleon
hash family (L,H) is sent to the designated user.
2. Key Generation.
• Given an identity ID and the master secret key s
as input, output dID.
• On input 1k, run the key generation algorithm
of the trapdoor hash family (L,H) to obtain the
hash/trapdoor key pair (HK,TK).
3. OffSigncrypt. Given params, IDS’s private key
dIDS , hash key HKS and the receiver’s identity IDR
as input, this algorithm outputs an offline signature σ′.
4. OnSigncrypt. Given a message m, receiver’s identity
IDR, hash/trapdoor key pair (HKS , TKS) and an of-
fline signature σ′ as input, this algorithm outputs the
ciphertext C.
5. UnSigncrypt. Given params, a ciphertext C, the
sender’s identity IDS and the receiver’s private key
dIDR as input, this algorithm outputs the plaintext m
or the symbol “⊥”. “⊥” denotes that C is an invalid
ciphertext between IDS and IDR.
Correctness. The algorithm UnSigncrypt will output a
plaintext if the ciphertext and the offline signature are
generated as defined above.
m← UnSigncrypt(params, OnSigncrypt(params,m,
IDR,HKS , TKS , OffSign(params, IDR, dIDS ,HKS)),
IDS , IDR, dIDR)
3.2. Security Models of Generic Identity-
based Online/Offline Signcryption
An, Dodis, and Rabin [1] generalized IND-CCA2 no-
tion slightly, by introducing an equivalence relationR with
property: R(c1, c2) = true ⇒ Dec(c1) = Dec(c2) (c1
and c2 are ciphertexts). R is called decryption-respecting.
We may use it to restrict the attacker from decrypting other
encryptions of the target message. We say that the encryp-
tion scheme E is ciphertext indistinguishable against gen-
eralized CCA2 (or gCCA2) if there exists some efficient
decryption-respecting relation R with respect to which it
is CCA2-secure.
Our scheme is based on the CtE&S which is called
“commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” paradigm [1]. Before pre-
senting our scheme, we revisit some theorems and issues
addressed in [1] as follows:
Theorem 1. [1] Assume that E is IND-gCCA2-secure, S is
UF-CMA-secure and C satisfies the syntactic properties of
a commitment scheme. Then, in the insider-security model,
we have:
• CtE&S is IND-gCCA2-secure⇐⇒ C satisfies the hid-
ing property.
• CtE&S is UF-CMA secure⇐⇒ C satisfies the relaxed
binding property.
Thus, CtE&S preserves security of E and S iff C is a se-
cure relaxed commitment. In particular, any secure regular
commitment C yields secure signcryption CtE&S.
The chameleon hash function can be regarded as a com-
mitment. It should be noted that since chameleon hash func-
tions C are information-theoretically hiding, it is safe for the
receiver when the sender chooses a bad commitment key
(the hiding property is satisfied for all HK’s, and it is in
sender’s interest to choose HK so that the binding is sat-
isfied as well). It is easy to determine that our proposed
chameleon hash function satisfies both properties.
We can find from the next Section that our scheme is
similar to CtE&S except that we move the expensive sig-
nature part to offline phase. We also modified the en-
cryption part to be more suitable in identity-based system.
Hence, if our encryption part is IND-gCCA2-secure and
we choose some UF-CMA secure identity-based signature
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scheme combined with the chameleon hash function, we
can construct an IND-gCCA2 secure and UF-CMA secure
identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme. A proof
for the encryption part can be found in Section 5.
4. Our Generic Identity-Based Online/Offline
Signcryption Scheme
System Parameters Generation: Let t be a prime power,
and E(Ft) an elliptic curve over finite field Ft. Let #E(Ft)
be the number of points of E(Ft), and P be a point of
E(Ft) with prime order q where q|#E(Ft). G1 is the sub-
group generated by P . G2 is a finite group of order q.
Choose cryptographic hash function H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n.
Let (L,H) be the chameleon hash family, which will be
sent to the designated user on request, based on the dis-
crete logarithm assumption and (G,S,V) be any identity-
based signature scheme. The system parameters are SP =
{E(Ft), t, q, P, G1, G2, (G,S,V),H1}.
Key Generation:
• Given an identity ID, run the key extract algorithm of
the original identity-based signature scheme to obtain
the private/public key pair (dID, QID).
• On input 1k, the sender runs the key generation algo-
rithm of the trapdoor hash family (L,H) to obtain the
hash/trapdoor key pair (Y = xP, x).
Assume Alice sends m to Bob. Alice obtains private key
and hash/trapdoor key {dIDA , Y, x}. Bob obtains private
key dIDB . {QIDA , QIDB} are public to both of them.
OffSigncrypt:
• Choose at random (m′, r′) ∈R M×R, whereM is a
message space andR is a finite space, and compute the
chameleon hash value h = HY (m′, r′) = m′P + r′Y .
• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key
dIDA to sign the hash value h. Let the output be
σ = SdIDA (h||HY ), where HY is the description of
the chameleon hash.
• Choose at random y ∈R Z∗q and compute X = yP ,
then compute ω = e(yPpub, QIDB ). Finally set y
′ =
H1(ω).
• Store the pair (m′, r′) and y′ for future use.
OnSigncrypt:
• For a given message m, retrieve from the memory x−1
and the pair (m′, r′).
• Compute r = x−1(m′ −m) + r′ mod q.
• The message encryption is done with y′ and a
symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The
ciphertext is c = Ency′(σ||IDA||m||r||HY ).
• Final ciphertext is (c,X).
UnSigncrypt:
• Given ciphertext (c,X), compute ω = e(X, dIDB )
and y′ = H1(ω).
• Decrypt c as σ||IDA||m||r||HY = Decy′(c).
• Compute h = HY (m, r) = mP + rY .
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the value h||HY
with respect to the verification key QIDA .
Correctness: The consistency is easy to verify as follows:
e(yPpub, QIDB ) = e(yP, dIDB ) = e(X, dIDB ).
Performance: The proposed scheme satisfies the require-
ment of online/offline signcryption as all expensive com-
putations are done in the offline phase. The offline phase
of our signcryption mainly consists of one evaluation of
the trapdoor hash function, one invocation of the original
signing algorithm and one pairing computation. The online
phase consists of only a single collision finding computation
and a symmetric-key encryption. The UnSigncrypt algo-
rithm consists of one evaluation of the trapdoor hash func-
tion, one invocation of the original verification algorithm,
one pairing computation and a symmetric-key decryption.
5. Security Proof
We can choose most of UF-CMA secure identity-based
signatures as long as the key extraction algorithm is the
same as in the encryption scheme below. We prove the
encryption scheme is IND-gCCA2 secure to complete our
proof.
Setup: Given security parameters k, n and G1, G2 of order
q and generator P of G1, pick a random s ∈ Z∗q , and set
Ppub = sP . Choose cryptographic hash functions H0 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n. R is decryption-
respecting mentioned before. The system parameters are
(P, Ppub,H0,H1). The master key is s. H0 and H1 will be
regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract: Given an identity ID, compute dID = sH0(ID)
and output it as the private key related to ID corresponding
to QID = H0(ID).
Encrypt: Given a message m, choose at random y ∈R Z∗q
and compute X = yP , then compute ω = (yPpub, QIDB ),
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finally set y′ = H1(ω). The message encryption is done
with y′ and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as
AES. The ciphertext is (c,X), where c = Ency′(m).
Decrypt: Given a ciphertext (c,X), Compute ω =
e(X, dIDB ) and Set y
′ = H1(ω), then decrypt the message
Decy′(c) = m.
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model, assume we have
an IND-gCCA2 adversary called A that is able to distin-
guish ciphertexts that succeeds with probability ε and ask-
ing H0, H1 and decryption oracle q0, q1 and qd times
respectively. Then, there exists a simulator B that can
solve the GBDH problem with the probability at least





Proof. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be the instance of the GBDH
problem to be solved, the aim is to compute e(P, P )abc
where a, b, c are chosen at random from Z∗q and P generates
G1. B will run A as a subroutine and act as A’s challenger
in the IND-gCCA2 game. B needs to maintain lists L0 and
L1 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of an-
swers to queries asked by A to oracles H0, H1. B gives A
the system parameters with Ppub = bP .
We describe how the requests are treated below.
H0 requests: At the beginning of the simulation, choose
iβ uniformly at random from {1, . . . , q0}. If i = iβ then
respond with H0(IDU ) = aP and set IDβ = IDU , else
choose x uniformly at random from Z∗q ; compute QU =
xP ; compute dU = xPpub; store (IDU , QU , dU , x) in L0
and respond with QU .
H1 requests: for a query H1(ω), B first ensures the list L1
does not contain a tuple (ω, y′). If such a tuple is found, B
answers y′, otherwise he chooses y′ ∈R Z∗q , gives it as an
answer to the query and puts the tuple (ω, y′) into L1.
Key extraction requests : We assume that A makes the
query H0(IDU ) before it makes the extraction query for
IDU . When A asks a query Extract(IDU ), if IDU =
IDβ , then abort the simulation, otherwise B searches L0
for the entry (IDU , QU , dU , x) corresponding to IDU and
returns dU .
Decryption requests: When receiving an decryption query
for a ciphertext (c,X) for identities IDU that are not IDβ ,
find the entry (IDU , QU , dU , x) in L0 and compute ω =
(X, dU ), then run the H1 simulation algorithm to find y′ =
H1(ω), finally decrypt the ciphertext Decy′(c) = m.
When receiving an decryption query for a ciphertext (c,X)
for identities IDU = IDβ , B steps through the list L1 with
entries (ω, y′). For each pair in L1, B submits the tuple
(P,H0(IDβ), Ppub,X, ω) to DBDH oracle. The DBDH
oracle returns 1 if ω = e(X, dIDβ ) and 0 otherwise. If
the returned value is 1, B will use the corresponding y′ to
decrypt the ciphertext Decy′(c) = m. Otherwise B takes a
random pair (ω, y′) such that no (ω, .) already exists in L1,
then decrypt the message Decy′(c) = m and put the tuple
(ω, y′) into L1.
After a polynomially bounded number of queries, A
chooses an identity IDB on which he wishes to be chal-
lenged and produces his two plaintexts m0 and m1. The
restriction is that A cannot have chosen IDB as one of
key extraction requests. If IDB = IDβ , B aborts the
simulation. Otherwise B chooses c∗ ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sets
X∗ = cP . It returns the challenge ciphertext (c∗,X∗) to
A. A then performs a second series of queries which is
treated in the same way as the first one. This time, he can
not make a key extraction request on IDB and he can not
make an decrypt query of (c′,X ′) equivalent to (c∗,X∗), i.
e. R((c′,X ′), (c∗,X∗)) = true.
At the end of the simulation, A produces a bit b. The
simulator ignores this bit. It chooses some ω at random
from L1 and returns ω as its guess at the solution to the
GBDH problem for (P, aP, bP, cP ).
Let us now consider how our simulation could fail, i.e.
describe events that could cause A’s view to differ when
run by B from its view in a real attack. It is clear that the
simulations for H0, H1 and Decryption oracle are indistin-
guishable from real random oracles. B will abort the key
extraction oracle, if dIDβ was asked. The probability for the
oracle to abort is at most 1/q0. With a probability exactly
1/q0, A chooses to be challenged on IDβ . If A queries
the H1 oracle for ω = e(P, P )abc, the simulation would
fail. However, if A has any advantage it must make this
query, and once it has done so we have trapped it into leav-
ing enough information in L1 to solve the GBDH problem
with probability 1/q1.
We conclude from the above that B succeeds with prob-
ability as follows:










6. Application to Broadcast Signcryption
We now present a generic identity-based online/offline
broadcast signcryption scheme based on the work in [2].
System Parameters Generation, Key Generation: As in
our proposed scheme.
Assume user 1 broadcasts message m to a group of N users.
Initialization: Let QID1 be the public key of the user 1,
and K1N ∈R Z∗q be the broadcast secret of user 1 for a
group of N users. User 1 will compute the broadcast para-
meter P1−brdcst as: P1−brdcst = K1NQID1 . User 1 will
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deliver the parameter P1−brdcst to other users in the group
by encrypting in each group-member’s pairwise shared key
(k = e(dID1 , QIDi) i ∈ N ) with user 1.
OffSigncrypt:
• Choose at random (m′, r′) ∈R M×R, whereM is a
message space andR is a finite space, and compute the
chameleon hash value h = HY (m′, r′) = m′P + r′Y .
• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key
dID1 to sign the hash value h. Let the output be
σ = SdID1 (h||HY ), where HY is the description of
the chameleon hash.
• Choose at random y ∈R Z∗q and compute ω =
e(QID1 , P )
y , then compute X = yK−11NP . Finally
Set y′ = H1(ω).
• Store the pair (m′, r′) and y′ for future use.
OnSigncrypt:
• For a given message m, retrieve from the memory x−1
and the pair (m′, r′).
• Compute r = x−1(m′ −m) + r′ mod q.
• The message encryption is done with y′ and a
symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The
ciphertext is c = Ency′(σ||m||r||HY ).
• Final ciphertext is (c,X).
UnSigncrypt:
Given a ciphertext (c,X), the authorized receivers (i.e.,
members of the group provided with broadcast parameter
P1−brdcst = K1NQID1) will compute the key y
′.
• Given ciphertext (c,X), compute ω = e(P1−brdcst,
X) and y′ = H1(ω).
• Decrypt c as σ||m||r||HY = Decy′(c).
• Compute h = HY (m, r) = mP + rY .
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the hash value
h||HY with respect to the verification key QID1 .
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a generic identity-based
online/offline signcryption scheme. In our scheme, the
online computation is very efficient and all the expensive
computation is performed offline. Our scheme is generic
and does not require specific identity-based signatures and
symmetric-key encryption schemes. Our scheme is secure
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-gCCA2)
and is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-
message attacks (UF-CMA) provided that the signature part
is UF-CMA secure. We also present a broadcast signcryp-
tion scheme as an application of the scheme.
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